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THE LIMITS OF INTEGRITY
JOHN D. INAZU*
I
INTRODUCTION
Stanley Hauerwas has long objected to “liberal presuppositions and
theories” of law that “have sought in theory and practice to protect the law
1
from politics.” His critiques flow out of broader objections to the contemporary
liberalism of John Rawls and, to a lesser extent, the antecedents of Rawlsian
2
liberalism in the postwar pluralism of Robert Dahl. One of Hauerwas’s chief
targets is Rawls’s public reason constraint, which limits the role of certain
3
theological voices in considerations of law and policy.
Hauerwas’s arguments and the theological framework in which they are
embedded can also stand against certain strands of legal theory. This article
demonstrates that possibility by using Hauerwas to critique Ronald Dworkin’s
theory of law as integrity. Hauerwas’s arguments reveal how Dworkin relies on
secular, liberal presuppositions by rejecting appeals to “religious convictions or
4
goals.”
Part II sketches Dworkin’s interpretive theory, and part III notes its
limitations. Part IV introduces Hauerwas’s views on interpretation and suggests
commonalities between Dworkin and Hauerwas. Parts V and VI illustrate the
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1. Stanley Hauerwas, Christian Practice and the Practice of Law in a World Without Foundations,
44 MERCER L. REV. 743, 743 (1993). For an overview of Hauerwas’s thought and its relationship to law,
see John D. Inazu, Stanley Hauerwas and the Law: Is There Anything to Say?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 4, 2012 at i.
2. See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS, PERFORMING THE FAITH: BONHOEFFER AND THE PRACTICE
OF NONVIOLENCE 227 (2004) [hereinafter HAUERWAS, PERFORMING THE FAITH] (“[Sheldon] Wolin
taught me to read Rawls not as the exemplification of democracy, but rather as an attempt to deny the
necessity of politics. I read Wolin, moreover, against the background of debates at Yale during my
graduate training generated by the work of Robert Dahl. I became convinced that critics of Dahl’s
defense of interest group liberalism . . . were right to see that there was a ‘bias of pluralism.’”).
3. Id. The debate surrounding the implications of Rawls’s public reason constraint on religious
argument is widespread. See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE
PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE (1997). Although I
focus in this essay on a Christian theological response to the Rawlsian and Dworkinian constraints,
those constraints also reject illiberal or “irrational” religious argument arising out of other theological
traditions.
4. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 254 (2006).
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exclusionary effects of Dworkin’s premises on Hauerwas’s arguments by
comparing the ways in which both thinkers approach the abortion controversy.
Hauerwas’s arguments show that Dworkin has either imported his own
normative commitments into his interpretive premises or failed to distinguish
5
law as integrity from the constraints of public reason.
II
DWORKIN’S THEORY OF INTERPRETATION
Dworkin believes that what law “permits or requires depends on the truth of
certain propositions that are given sense only by and within the practice” of
6
legal interpretation. For this reason, the process of identifying interpretive
standards and how they change over time is partially constitutive of the practice
7
itself. Dworkin identifies four stages in this process: the semantic stage, the
8
jurisprudential stage, the doctrinal stage, and the adjudicative stage.
The semantic stage ensures that participants “understand the world in
sufficiently similar ways and have interests and convictions sufficiently similar
9
to recognize the sense in each other’s claims.” Dworkin’s recent formulation of
the semantic stage suggests a seemingly benign starting point: “What
assumptions and practices must people share to make it sensible to say that they
share the doctrinal concept so that they can intelligibly agree and disagree
10
about its application?”
The jurisprudential stage includes “a general account of the mix of values
11
that best justifies the practice.” Dworkin describes this stage as gathering the
12
“tentative content” of the authorities that will inform adjudication. He asserts
5. Importantly, Hauerwas offers neither a “theory” of interpretation nor an “ethics” of abortion.
His insistence that theories and ethics cannot be abstracted from a community of people formed by
certain habituated practices prevents him from embracing a systematic approach like the one Dworkin
advocates. Nonetheless, Hauerwas’s critiques can be employed against Dworkin to show why the
expression of nonpropositional practices has a role in legal interpretation.
6. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 13 (1986). This claim helpfully presses against a
perspective fashionable in some political-science scholarship that neglects—or, in some strong versions,
denies—any internal dimension to the practice of legal interpretation and asserts that legal decisions
are simply “judicial politics.” See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
7. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 47 (noting that, when the “interpretive attitude” takes hold,
people “try to impose meaning on the institution—to see it in its best light—and then to restructure it in
the light of that meaning”).
8. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 9–21. Dworkin recognizes that these four stages are, “of course,
artificial” and that “legal philosophers do not articulate their theories in this stylized way. But the
artificial anatomy provides a useful schema for identifying and distinguishing a variety of types of legal
theories.” Id. at 21.
9. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 63.
10. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 9.
11. Id. at 12–13. The initial values come from “studying the aspirational concept of law to
determine which values supply the best conception of that concept—which other values, that is, best
explain the rule of law as a political ideal.” Id. at 13.
12. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 65. In the interpretive practice of the law, these authorities include
constitutions, statutes, codes, legal decisions, and other generally recognized sources of law, as well as
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that “[a] useful theory of an interpretive concept must itself be an
interpretation, which is very likely to be controversial, of the practice in which
13
the concept figures.”
In the doctrinal stage, participants “construct an account of the truth
conditions of propositions of law in the light of the values identified at the
14
jurisprudential stage.” A proposition of law is true “if it flows from principles
of personal and political morality that provide the best interpretation of the
other propositions of law generally treated as true in contemporary legal
15
practice.” Participants “measure the success of a proposed justification” along
16
two lines: value and fit. Value describes ends that the practice serves—like
justice, freedom, legality, democracy, liberty, equality, community, and
17
patriotism. Fit requires that any viable account bears some connection to the
authorities identified in the jurisprudential stage to ensure continuity within the
18
practice.
Finally, in the adjudicative stage, participants ask “what political officials
who are generally expected to enforce the law should actually do in particular
19
cases.” The adjudicative stage unveils the reflective dimension of Dworkin’s
interpretive theory: the interpreters reexamine the appropriateness of the
20
authorities they identified in the jurisprudential stage. With the benefit of
having selected the best account in the doctrinal stage, the participants may
conclude that this account excludes some of the authorities previously deemed
relevant to the interpretation of their practice—for example, by overruling or
distinguishing precedent that initially appeared controlling. As important, the
participants may recognize additional applicable authorities not identified at the
jurisprudential stage, which are then incorporated as obligations for those
involved in the practice. And, in this way, newly recognized obligations are
generated by the interpretive practice itself.

“interpretive concepts” like principles and political values. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 10–11. Any
account must also “give a prominent place to the ideal of political integrity, that is, to the principle that
a state should try so far as possible to govern through a coherent set of political principles whose
benefit it extends to all citizens.” Id. at 13.
13. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 12.
14. Id. at 13.
15. Id. at 14.
16. Id. at 15.
17. Id. at 142, 151, 158.
18. Id. at 15. The requirement that the best interpretation of the practice include at least some of
the authorities identified in the jurisprudential stage is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of
Dworkin’s interpretive theory: even an account that includes all of the authorities from the
jurisprudential stage may lack fit if it fails to provide a coherent, explanatory, and justificatory account
of the practice. As importantly, the best interpretation may draw upon authorities not identified in the
jurisprudential stage. Accordingly, assessing fit, like assessing value, is an interpretative act. See
STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 40 (1997).
19. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that this is “a political and therefore a moral question”).
20. See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 48 (“Interpretation folds back into the practice, altering its
shape.”).
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III
A BIG ENOUGH THEORY?
Dworkin believes that legal interpretation is “an explicitly normative and
political enterprise: refining and defending conceptions of legality and drawing
21
tests for concrete claims of law from favored conceptions.” He maintains that
22
“law is a political concept” and that interpretive claims are “dependent on
23
aesthetic or political theory all the way down.” And he insists that the
weighing of fit against value at the doctrinal stage of his interpretive theory “is
the constraint of one type of political conviction on another in the overall
24
judgment.” Yet he concludes that law as integrity nevertheless “aims, in the
interpretive spirit, to lay principle over practice to show the best route to a
25
better future, keeping the right faith with the past.”
Dworkin also acknowledges that the outcome of legal interpretation at the
26
adjudicative stage depends on “decisions taken at the basic semantic stage.”
The semantic stage ensures that people share certain “assumptions and
practices” that allow them to recognize “the doctrinal concept of law” so they
27
can “intelligibly agree and disagree about its application.” But, as Dworkin
recognizes, these assumptions and practices themselves draw upon “interpretive
28
concepts.” One of these concepts is justice, which “marks an agenda for the
community as a whole” that precedes and shapes “further questions about what
29
institutional decisions would be necessary” to achieve that agenda. In fact,
30
Dworkin considers justice to be “the most abstract political concept of all.”
31
Some of Dworkin’s constraints resemble Rawlsian public reason. Rawls
21. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 170. Dworkin places political values “in a larger and mutually
supporting web of conviction that displays supporting connections among moral and political values
generally and then places these in the still larger context of ethics.” Id. at 168; cf. RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 36 (1996) (“Of course
my constitutional opinions are influenced by my own convictions of political morality.”).
22. Ronald Dworkin, Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy, 24 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD., no. 1, 2004 at 1, 19.
23. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 168 (1985).
24. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 257.
25. Id. at 413. Stanley Fish has argued that, “whenever the distinction between principle and policy
is invoked, the line it draws will be bright and visible only within the assumptions of some policy that is,
for the moment, so deeply in force as to be beyond challenge; but the challenge can always be made,
and when it is, that line—interpretive, constructed, and political to the core—will be drawn again.”
STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 369 (1989). The debate between Fish and Dworkin spans
many years. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 43–48.
26. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 20.
27. Id. at 9.
28. Id. at 11.
29. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 406; cf. Gerald J. Postema, Integrity: Justice in Workclothes, 82
IOWA L. REV. 821, 841 (1997) (“The mandate of justice is not only to set social arrangements in right
order, but to make the rightness of that order manifest to every member of society.”).
30. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 148.
31. Rawls’s seminal work is JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Rawls believed that
liberal society could never overcome the interminable disagreement that flowed from incommensurable
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insisted that, on matters subject to public reason, “we are to appeal only to
presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common
sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not
32
controversial.” Because public reason applies to citizens when they vote,
“[w]hat public reason asks is that citizens be able to explain their vote to one
33
another in terms of a reasonable balance of public political values.”
Dworkin has resisted comparisons between law as integrity and Rawlsian
public reason, arguing in Justice in Robes that he has “great difficulties” with
Rawls’s distinction “between political values on the one hand and
34
comprehensive moral convictions on the other.” But Dworkin nonetheless
insists on “filling out a conception of legality and adjudication” with “necessary
35
constraints on judicial argument.” In one of his most revealing claims, he
asserts that “[j]udges may not appeal to religious convictions or goals in liberal
societies because such convictions cannot figure in an overall comprehensive
justification of the legal structure of a liberal and tolerant pluralistic
36
community.”
“comprehensive doctrines.” JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 224 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. But he maintained that we could nonetheless achieve political stability that
was more than a mere modus vivendi by constraining the dialogue between citizens through the concept
of public reason. Id. at 148. To this end, Rawls advocated that a “political conception” of justice could
be attained “without reference” to comprehensive doctrines. Id. at 12. For Rawls, comprehensive
doctrines “belong to what we may call the ‘background culture’ of civil society,” which “is the culture of
the social, not of the political.” Id. at 14. In its most nuanced form, public reason “still allows us to
introduce into political discussion at any time our comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious,
provided that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our
comprehensive doctrine is said to support.” John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 765, 776 (1997). This reasoning echoes Rawls’s view in Political Liberalism that citizens
can invoke comprehensive doctrines “provided they do this in ways that strengthen the idea of public
reason itself.” RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra, at 247.
32. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 31, at 224. Rawls would not apply the public
reason constraint to all political activity but only to “fundamental matters.” Id. at 214. Rawls considers
“much tax legislation and many laws regulating property” not to be fundamental matters. Id.
33. Id. at 243. Thus, according to Rawlsian premises, we are to believe that large segments of the
population engage in a series of coherent argumentative steps to reach informed and intellectually
defensible positions on a host of complex matters ranging from healthcare to foreign policy to medical
ethics.
34. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 253; see also RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE
HERE? 65 (2006) (“The schism over religion in America shows the limitations of Rawls’s project of
political liberalism, his strategy of insulating political convictions from deeper moral, ethical, and
religious conviction. Our strategy must be different.”). Dworkin contends that, “[i]f we accept an
interpretivist conception, we do not need a separate doctrine like the doctrine of public reason.”
DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 254.
35. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 254.
36. Id. Others have also linked Dworkin’s law as integrity with Rawls’s public reason. See Paul F.
Campos, Secular Fundamentalism, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1814, 1826–27 (1994) (“Law as integrity parallels
the idea of public reason legitimating the exercise of coercive state power ‘in accordance with a
constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of
principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.’”); Edward J. McCaffery, Ronald
Dworkin, Inside-Out, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1043, 1057 (1997) (book review) (“Dworkin’s method can be
understood as a form of public reason in the law.”); cf. George Rutherglen, Private Law and Public
Reason, 92 VA. L. REV. 1503, 1511 (2006) (“Dworkin would not have to modify much of his legal or
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The consequences of this constraint are twofold. First, it discourages or
inhibits religious argument in our discussions about the nature of law and how
we understand its meaning. Even though Dworkin limits his constraint to
“judges,” the premise on which it rests is far broader: “[R]eligious
convictions . . . cannot figure in an overall comprehensive justification of the
37
legal structure of a liberal and tolerant pluralistic community.” Dworkin may
well be right that some theocratically oriented arguments from religious
fundamentalism are incompatible with the legal structure of contemporary
American democracy. But given his interpretive commitment to an
argumentative process, it seems odd that Dworkin would reject outright even
overtly theocratic arguments. For even though such arguments will likely fail
Dworkin’s fit requirement, they might nonetheless yield useful insights within
the reflexive interpretive process Dworkin advocates.
Moreover, by invoking a blanket restriction against “religious conceptions
or goals,” Dworkin bears the burden of explaining why every religious
argument fails to “figure in an overall comprehensive justification of the legal
38
structure of a liberal and tolerant pluralistic community.” For example, he
would need to explain why the concept of sphere sovereignty arising out of the
Dutch Calvinist tradition and articulated by contemporary thinkers like Jim
39
Skillen could not align with the political ordering of a pluralistic community.
He would also need to show how the quite different political theology of the
Mennonite John Howard Yoder has nothing to offer a legal structure consistent
40
with a liberal pluralistic community. Religious arguments like those offered by
Skillen and Yoder may not prevail as the best or most persuasive accounts of
political theory to limit the range of political discourse to what Rawls recognizes as reasonable.”).
37. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 254. Importantly, the participants engaging in the interpretive
practice of law are not limited to judges. Judicial opinions are not hermetically sealed to the influence
of lawyers, clerks, litigants, journalists, politicians, academics, and legislators. Dworkin’s exclusion of
religious convictions and goals encounters further difficulty because it assumes a well-functioning
communal practice of legal interpretation in the absence of appeals to those convictions or goals. But
the existence of that practice is far from clear—particularly when it comes to judicial resolution of the
most controversial social issues. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 232 n.229 (1993) (“Dworkin’s theory
depends, anachronistically, upon the actual (not notional) existence of a community of lawyers sharing
professional norms of argument and rationality.”).
38. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 254.
39. See JIM SKILLEN, RECHARGING THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT: PRINCIPLED PLURALISM FOR
GENUINE CIVIC COMMUNITY (1994); see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Tort Law and Intermediate
Communities: Calvinist and Catholic Insights, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 486
(Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Corchran, Jr. & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001); Paul Horwitz,
Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 79
(2009). For an example of a liberal pluralist recognition of these perspectives, see WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM 23–26 (2005).
40. See, e.g., JOHN HOWARD YODER, THE CHRISTIAN WITNESS TO THE STATE (2002); JOHN
HOWARD YODER, THE PRIESTLY KINGDOM: SOCIAL ETHICS AS GOSPEL (1984). Thomas Shaffer has
asserted that Yoder’s scholarship contained “an implicit theology of law, a jurisprudence, and a legal
ethic.” THOMAS L. SHAFFER, MORAL MEMORANDA FROM JOHN HOWARD YODER: CONVERSATIONS
ON LAW, ETHICS AND THE CHURCH BETWEEN A MENNONITE THEOLOGIAN AND A HOOSIER
LAWYER, at iii (2002).
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the legal structure, but Dworkin gives no reason to exclude them a priori from
among the arguments that might be considered in the practice of legal
41
interpretation.
The second consequence of Dworkin’s constraint on “religious convictions
and goals” is that it neutralizes what may be the strongest objections to his own
normative commitments. Here it is important to note that Dworkin’s
application of law as integrity moves beyond “an overall comprehensive
justification of the legal structure” to discrete issues like abortion and
42
euthanasia. Tellingly, Dworkin’s eventual policy positions look remarkably
similar to those that Rawls espouses. That Rawls and Dworkin reach such
uniformity across a range of controversial issues might raise our suspicions
about the premises that make their syllogisms operable. And in questioning
those premises, we should be mindful not only of what they assert but also of
what they exclude.
IV
HAUERWAS AND DWORKIN
Like Dworkin, Hauerwas recognizes that acts like legal interpretation are
political precisely because they are embedded in communal practices:
[P]olitics is nothing else but a community’s internal conversation with itself concerning
the various possibilities of understanding and extending its life. In fact, the very
discussion necessary to maintain the tradition can be considered an end in itself, since
it provides the means for the community to discover the goods it holds in common.
Without the authority of the tradition to guide such a discussion there would be no
43
possibility of the community drawing nearer to the truth about itself or the world.

Political authority “must be grounded in a community’s self-understanding,
44
which is embodied in its habits, customs, laws, and traditions.” This authority
“allows for reasoned interpretations of the community’s past and future
45
goals.” Interpretation, in turn, is “the constant adjustment that is required if
46
the current community is to stay in continuity with tradition.” For Hauerwas,
“[i]nterpretation is not an objective science because, from beginning to end, it is
an exercise in politics. It is not only about power and authority, but also about
shared goods and judgments that constitute a history worth remembering for a
47
people.” Interpretation must “remain open to a new narrative display not only
41. Of course, Dworkin’s categorical exclusion of religious convictions or goals extends beyond
arguments like those from Skillen and Yoder. See, e.g., SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE
ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND THE FEMINIST SUBJECT (2005) (critiquing “secular-liberal and progressive
sensibilities” through an exploration of Islamic revival movements).
42. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993).
43. STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER: TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE
CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC 61 (1981).
44. Id. at 60.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 61.
47. STANLEY HAUERWAS, UNLEASHING THE SCRIPTURE: FREEING THE BIBLE FROM CAPTIVITY
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in relation to the future, but also whenever we come to a new understanding of
48
our past.” This kind of understanding starkly contrasts the “ahistorical
rationalism derived from the illusion of American Constitutionalism—that is,
49
that the law can be based upon principles abstracted from practices.”
Hauerwas’s approach to interpretation shares much with Dworkin’s
approach. Both presuppose an internal point of view in which a community’s
self-understanding shapes the intelligibility of its propositions. Both purport to
recognize the inescapably political nature of all interpretation. Both
acknowledge that interpretation is partially constitutive of the shared ends of
the participants in a practice. And Hauerwas’s contention that the “current
community” must “stay in continuity” with the tradition from which it emerges
resembles Dworkin’s fit requirement.
Dworkin and Hauerwas also share an epistemology that hangs in the
50
balance between a fixed textualism and an unbounded pragmatism. Although
they recognize a contingent flexibility to the meaning of language, they do not
think that meaning is completely determined by use simply because some
51
meanings that now seem obvious might later be rendered ambiguous. Rather,
our very ability to make interpretive judgments relies on a degree of shared
meaning. We abide in a certain grammar that bounds our interpretations and
52
gives us normal cases that are not utterly malleable. Both Hauerwas and
TO AMERICA

21 (1993).
48. HAUERWAS, supra note 43, at 61.
49. Hauerwas, supra note 1, at 746 (citing Mary Ann Glendon, Tradition and Creativity in Culture
and Law, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1992, at 13, 15–16).
50. Their epistemic views resemble those advanced by Ludwig Wittgenstein. See, e.g., LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953). On
Wittgenstein’s influence on Hauerwas, see BRAD J. KALLENBERG, ETHICS AS GRAMMAR: CHANGING
THE POSTMODERN SUBJECT (2001); see also Peter Dula, Wittgenstein Among the Theologians, in
UNSETTLING ARGUMENTS: A FESTSCHRIFT ON THE OCCASION OF STANLEY HAUERWAS’S 70TH
BIRTHDAY 3 (Charles R. Pinches, Kelly S. Johnson & Charles M. Collier eds., 2010). Although
Wittgenstein’s influence on Dworkin has not been widely discussed, and although Dworkin himself
might reject the comparison, some of Dworkin’s interpretive strategies seem deeply Wittgensteinian.
See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 68–73 (engaging in the thought experiment about the nature of
“courtesy” in an imaginary community).
51. Dworkin and Hauerwas both believe that some meaning of some texts is determined by the use
of those texts in a particular community, which is consistent with Wittgenstein’s understanding. In
contrast to Saul Kripke’s claim that “the meaning of a word is determined by its use,” Wittgenstein
wrote, “For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be
defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 50, ¶ 43.
52. Hauerwas’s grammar may be more internally coherent because it appeals to transcendence
and to an antecedent tradition to limit its malleability. Dworkin has no similar recourse. As James
Boyle has argued, because Dworkin’s notion of integrity “is a concept that is both interpretive and
deontological,” it “sounds best when one represses the knowledge that both the principles to be applied
and the boundaries within which they are applied are constantly being remade, and remade in a way
that turns to policy, to utilitarian calculation, to pragmatic consideration of effects.” James Boyle,
Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments? Integrity, Postmodernism, and Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 493,
503, 509 (1999). Boyle convincingly argues that, “if one’s proposition is that principle constrains in a
way that mere policy never could, one has to make it an historical claim rooted in a particular culture
and practice, not an epistemological or deontological claim rooted in the nature of language or morals.”
Id. at 509 (emphasis omitted).
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Dworkin imagine the possibility of participating in a world we find rather than
controlling a world we make—the abnormal cases give us pause, but the normal
53
cases let us begin before we arrive at the pause.
Significantly, both Dworkin and Hauerwas justify their epistemic practices
54
by a kind of faith. They do not and cannot know what comes next in their
interpretive traditions. Nor can they be certain that interpretive coherence will
continue in perpetuity: we may one day lack the practices to sustain it. We
might not even know when that day arrives, which is also to admit the
55
possibility that it is already upon us.
Although Hauerwas addresses his interpretive guidance with theological
particularity to the Christian church, he insists that the interpretations emerging
from that community have implications for the world. He writes that the church
is “an ontological necessity if we are to know rightly that our world is capable of
narrative construal” and that “[w]ithout the church the world would have no
56
history.” It is from this starting point, “from the life of the church, past,
present, and future, that [Christians] even come to understand the nature of
57
politics and have a norm by which all other politics can be judged.”
While this language is wildly incongruent with Dworkinian (and Rawlsian)
58
assumptions, it is not a theocratic claim. To the contrary, Hauerwas’s
53. Wittgenstein insisted that “[i]nterpretations by themselves do not determine meaning” because
“any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support.”
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 50, ¶ 198. As D.Z. Phillips has argued,
[i]nterpretations, like theory-laden perceptions, are parasitic on concepts which are not
interpretations, and on perceptions which are not theory-laden. For example, there are
situations where we need to interpret whether someone is angry or sorrowful. But were there
not situations in which what we mean by “anger” and “sorrow” does not call for
interpretation, the call for interpretation, in other contexts, would be unintelligible. If “anger”
and “sorrow” were not appreciated by someone in the situations where no interpretation is
called for, we would conclude that they did not understand what is meant by “anger” and
“sorrow.” To be sure, we can be puzzled, philosophically, about such concepts and that may
call for elucidation. Such elucidation, however, seeks to give a perspicuous representation of
the role those concepts actually have, not to get to something “behind” them of which they are
supposed to be interpretations.
D.Z. PHILLIPS, RELIGION AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF CONTEMPLATION 9 (2001).
54. Cf. D.Z. PHILLIPS, FAITH AFTER FOUNDATIONALISM 131, 132 (1988) (explaining that “saying
that our epistemic practices are not underpinned by any kind of metaphysical necessity . . . does not
entail that the practitioners of these practices are in a state of doubt as to whether the practice
corresponds to reality” and that, rather, “we justify our epistemic practices by faith”).
55. We could be like the hypothetical citizens at the beginning of Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue
who fail to see that they are no longer practicing science because “everything that they do and say
conforms to certain canons of consistency and coherence and those contexts which would be needed to
make sense of what they are doing have been lost, perhaps irretrievably.” ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
AFTER VIRTUE 1 (2d ed. 1984).
56. STANLEY HAUERWAS, CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY: ESSAYS ON CHURCH, WORLD, AND
LIVING IN BETWEEN 61 (1988). This is “the most determinative realist claim Christians can possibly
make.” Id.
57. HAUERWAS, supra note 43, at 2.
58. Hauerwas disputes my characterization. See Stanley Hauerwas, Trying to Have Something to
Say, 75 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2012 at 233, 248 (“I certainly do not want a rule by priests,
but I am a theocrat. I believe that Jesus is Lord, but Jesus Lordship is exercised as a rule of love that
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ubiquitous warnings about Christian complicity in state power have subjected
59
him more regularly to criticisms of sectarianism than theocracy. Although he
does not advocate for “a rejection of the world, or a withdrawal from the
world,” his first challenge is “for the church to be a ‘contrast model’ for all
60
polities that know not God.” For this reason, “the church must stand as a
reminder to the pretensions of liberalism that in spite of its claims to legitimate
authority, some necessarily rule over others as if they had the right to command
61
obedience.” But Hauerwas also believes that the church affects the structures
around it: “Christians do not have a theory that leaves everything the way it is,
62
but we are part of the community that changes everything.”
Dworkin’s interpretive account forecloses this kind of theological
particularity. For Dworkin, theological claims must be either translated in a way
that avoids reliance on “religious convictions or goals” or excluded from
consideration within his interpretive theory. Hauerwas refuses to acquiesce in
this kind of translation because to do so is to extract a proposition from the
practices that give it meaning.
If Dworkin wants to identify the best account of legal interpretation, then he
ought to be conceptually open to one that emerges from beyond the usual
constraints of contemporary political liberalism. In light of the interpretive
theory he has developed, it would seem that he should aim
to enter into controversy with other rival standpoints, doing so both in order to exhibit
what is mistaken in that rival standpoint in the light of the understanding afforded
one’s own point of view and in order to test and retest the central theses advanced
from one’s own point of view 63against the strongest possible objections to them to be
derived from one’s opponents.

By excluding appeals to “religious convictions or goals” like those that
Hauerwas makes, Dworkin may have failed to subject his interpretive
arguments to the most salient objections. To illustrate this possibility through a
concrete moral and political issue, the remainder of this article focuses on the
abortion controversy. The issue of abortion is well suited for a number of
reasons. First, to the extent that the current political arrangements in the
United States constitutionalize the abortion question, they implicate the kind of
legal interpretation covered by Dworkin’s theory. Second, both Hauerwas and
prohibits the killing of the neighbor. I would like to rule, but because I am committed to nonviolence I
cannot coerce my neighbor to do what I would like them to do. The only alternative is called
‘politics.’”). Hauerwas’s response asks us to think carefully about the theological meaning of
“theocracy,” but he risks introducing a category mistake. My point—and, I take it, his as well—is that
his theological commitments prevent him from harnessing the power of the state to coerce his
theological commitments upon others.
59. See, e.g., JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 140–61 (2004).
60. HAUERWAS, supra note 43, at 84–85.
61. Id. at 84.
62. Hauerwas, supra note 1, at 743.
63. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 230–32 (1990). Hauerwas advances similar arguments in STANLEY
HAUERWAS, THE STATE OF THE UNIVERSITY: ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGES AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF
GOD (2007).
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Dworkin have written about abortion in a way that facilitates a comparison of
64
their views and the theories that inform those views. Third, and perhaps
surprisingly, both agree that the debate over abortion is “religious” in nature.
V
DWORKIN ON ABORTION
Although Dworkin does not explicitly map his abortion argument to the
four stages of his interpretive theory, we can construct such an account to reveal
not only how his argument masks the semantic assumptions he claims to lay
bare but also the consequences of those assumptions for the kinds of arguments
Hauerwas makes. Dworkin identifies three values at issue in the constitutional
debate over abortion: (1) law as integrity; (2) the rights and interests of persons;
65
and (3) the sacredness of human life.
Dworkin applies the first value of law as integrity to any constitutional
question. It demands coherence within the ongoing practice of legal
66
interpretation. His second value, the rights and interests of persons, comes in
two forms: the right to procreative autonomy of a woman seeking an abortion
and the right to equal protection from harm by the fetus if the fetus is a
“person” in the constitutional sense. The threshold question of whether a fetus
is a person to whom rights attach forms the basis of what Dworkin calls the
67
“derivative” objection to abortion. The objection is derived in the sense that
the protections it demands from government come from the constitutional
rights attributed to the fetus. Dworkin dismisses the derived objection in his
68
most comprehensive consideration of abortion in Life’s Dominion.

64. Indeed, the issue of abortion is likely the one that provides the greatest topical overlap between
Dworkin’s and Hauerwas’s scholarship. Dworkin’s most comprehensive discussion of abortion is
DWORKIN, supra note 42. Hauerwas has written a number of essays focusing on abortion. See STANLEY
HAUERWAS, Abortion and Normative Ethics, in STANLEY HAUERWAS, VISION AND VIRTUE: ESSAYS
IN CHRISTIAN ETHICAL REFLECTION 127 (1974); STANLEY HAUERWAS, Abortion: The Agent’s
Perspective, in VISION AND VIRTUE: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICAL REFLECTION, supra, at 147;
STANLEY HAUERWAS, Abortion, Theologically Understood, in STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE
HAUERWAS READER 603 (John Berkman & Michael G. Cartwright eds., 2001) [hereinafter
HAUERWAS, Abortion, Theologically Understood]; HAUERWAS, supra note 43, at 196 (in particular, see
chapters entitled Why Abortion Is a Religious Issue and Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail).
65. See DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 148.
66. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 6.
67. DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 11.
68. Dworkin acknowledges the derived objection in Justice in Robes. Compare DWORKIN, supra
note 42, at 111 (“The contention that Justice Blackmun and everyone else rejected, that on the best
interpretation a fetus is a constitutional person, is easy to dismiss because it is so dramatically
contradicted by American history and practice.”), with DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 253–54 (“The view
that a fetus does not have interests and rights of its own is as much drawn from a comprehensive
position as the view that it does, and we cannot reach a decision about abortion without adopting one
of these two views. The Equal Protection Clause applies to all persons, and any argument that a woman
has a constitutional right to abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy must deny that a fetus is a
‘person’ within the meaning of the clause.”). Dworkin’s dismissal of the derived objection is not
uncontested. See, e.g., Gerald V. Bradley, Life’s Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
329 (1993) (book review). Dworkin’s construal and subsequent dismissal of Catholic theology seems
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The final value that Dworkin considers in his interpretation of the abortion
issue is the sacredness of life. He associates this value with the “detached”
objection to abortion, by which he means that the duty of government to
69
protect the fetus is not derived from constitutional rights. Dworkin explains
the value of sacredness:
The hallmark of the sacred as distinct from the incrementally valuable is that the
sacred is intrinsically valuable because—and therefore only once—it exists. It is
inviolable because of what it represents or embodies. It is not important that there be
more people. But once a human life has begun, it is very important that it flourish and
70
not be wasted.

Dworkin elaborates
[t]he sanctity of life is a highly controversial, contestable value. It is controversial, for
example, whether abortion or childbirth best serves the intrinsic value of life when a
fetus is deformed, or when having a child 71would seriously depress a woman’s chance to
make something valuable of her own life.

Dworkin’s appeal to the sacred leads him to conclude that “[w]e may
describe most people’s beliefs about the inherent value of human life—beliefs
72
deployed in their opinions about abortion—as essentially religious beliefs.” His
philosophical authority for this turn to religious belief is the Supreme Court’s
73
decision in United States v. Seeger, which suggested that an atheist’s system of
beliefs may have “a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the
74
orthodox belief in God.”
Dworkin contends that we should classify a belief as religious “by asking
75
whether it is sufficiently similar in content to plainly religious beliefs.” For
Dworkin, the category of religious belief is expansive: he “can think of no
plausible account of the content that a belief must have in order to be deemed
religious that would rule out convictions about why and how human life has
intrinsic objective importance, except the abandoned notion that religious belief
76
must presuppose a god.”
Having stipulated this broad interpretation of religious belief, Dworkin is
now ready to assess the competing interpretive arguments about abortion on
the basis of the three values he has identified: integrity, rights and interests, and
the sacredness of life. His value of integrity reinforces both the right to
procreative autonomy and the rejection of any notion of rights for a fetus. As
for procreative autonomy, Dworkin writes,
[t]he law’s integrity demands that the principles necessary to support an authoritative

particularly misguided. See id.; see also Russell Hittinger, Getting It Wrong, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 1993,
at 53 (book review).
69. DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 11.
70. Id. at 73–74.
71. Id. at 151.
72. Id. at 155.
73. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
74. Id. at 184.
75. DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 155.
76. Id. at 163.
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set of judicial decisions must be accepted in other contexts as well. It might seem an
appealing political compromise to apply the principle of procreative autonomy to
contraception, which almost no one now thinks states can forbid, but not to abortion,
which powerful constituencies violently oppose. But the point of integrity—the point
of law itself—is exactly to rule out political compromises of that kind. We must be one
nation of principle: our Constitution must represent conviction, not the tactical
77
strategies of justices eager to satisfy as many political constituencies as possible.

From Dworkin’s perspective, the outcome that integrity demands is almost
self-evident: “The right of procreative autonomy follows from any competent
interpretation of the due process clause and of the Supreme Court’s past
78
decisions applying it.” Once the Court established the right of procreative
autonomy, “it follows that women do have a constitutional right to privacy that
in principle includes the decision not only whether to beget children but
79
whether to bear them.” For Dworkin, integrity also provides a clear answer to
the question of the personhood (and thus the rights) of the fetus. He believes
that precedent interpreting the Equal Protection Clause clearly rejects the idea;
even “all the responsible opponents” of Blackmun’s opinion in Roe agree with
80
this conclusion.
Most of Dworkin’s legal arguments track the Supreme Court’s not
uncontroversial progression from Griswold v. Connecticut, which announced a
81
constitutional right of privacy, to Eisenstadt v. Baird, which transformed that
82
right to an individual right, to Roe v. Wade, which applied that right to
83
abortion. Dworkin’s characterization of these decisions is not uniformly
84
endorsed, and it leaves relatively undefended the original merits of Griswold.
As support for a right of procreative autonomy, it is hard to see how integrity
adds much to existing arguments.
Dworkin’s sacredness of life language does more work but is ultimately
unpersuasive. He first classifies all views about the sacredness of life as
“religious” because “[o]nce the idea of religion is separated from the idea of a
god . . . courts that accept the constraints of integrity face great difficulty in

77. Id. at 158.
78. Id. at 160.
79. Id. at 106. As Michael McConnell has argued, Rawls is similarly dismissive of challenges to a
right of procreative autonomy: Rawls thinks that “‘any comprehensive doctrine that leads to a balance
of political values excluding’ the right to an abortion by a ‘mature adult’ woman in the first trimester ‘is
to that extent unreasonable,’ because the ‘political value of the equality of women is overriding.’”
Michael W. McConnell, Religion and the Search for a Principled Middle Ground on Abortion, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 1893, 1893 (1994) (book review) (quoting RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 31, at
176).
80. DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 116; cf. id. at 110 (“Blackmun decided that a fetus is not a
constitutional person. Almost all responsible lawyers, including the political and academic critics of Roe
v. Wade, agree that his decision on that point was correct.”).
81. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
82. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
83. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
84. See DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 107 (“Justice Blackmun’s legal argument in Roe v. Wade was a
strong one if we assume that the Griswold decision was right.”).

09_INAZU_PBP (DO NOT DELETE)

194

11/19/2012 4:00 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 75:181
85

distinguishing between religious and other kinds of conviction.” Having
framed these arguments as religious arguments whose expression is protected
by the Free Exercise Clause, he declares that they fall beyond the competence
of legal interpretation: “[A]ny government that prohibits abortion commits
itself to a controversial interpretation of the sanctity of life and therefore limits
liberty by commanding one essentially religious position over others, which the
86
First Amendment forbids.” Dworkin elaborates,
A state may not curtail liberty, in order to protect an intrinsic value, when the effect
on one group of citizens would be special and grave, when the community is seriously
divided about what respect for that value requires, and when people’s opinions about
the nature of that value
reflect essentially religious convictions that are fundamental
87
to moral personality.

This semantic constraint arrives late in Dworkin’s argument (recall that
Dworkin places semantic constraints at the first stage of his interpretive theory).
But, having just classified even secular beliefs about the sacredness of life as
“religious,” he must be careful to limit the constraint. Accordingly, he argues
that “beliefs about the intrinsic importance of human life may be distinguished
from more secular convictions about morality, fairness, and justice” because
such “existential” questions cannot be answered “by showing that living in a
given recommended way—observing some specified moral code, for example,
or following a given theory of justice—will make people safer, freer, happier, or
more prosperous, or that it will help them to fulfill or realize their human
88
nature.” In contrast, questions of justice “address themselves to the issues of
how competing interests of people should be served or adjusted or
compromised; they rarely reflect a distinctive view about why human interests
89
have objective intrinsic importance, or even whether they do.”
Dworkin’s resolution of the abortion debate thus hinges on two semantic
assumptions. First, he classifies secular beliefs “about the intrinsic importance
of human life” as religious. Second, he classifies secular beliefs that a fetus lacks
personhood as not religious. After this razor-thin distinction between religious
and non-religious beliefs, the adjudicative stage of Dworkin’s interpretive
theory is almost an afterthought: the precedents are clearly correct, religious
arguments are wholly excluded, and the only permissible conclusion under a
theory of law as integrity is to embrace Roe v. Wade. In Dworkin’s view, critics
of Blackmun’s opinion on all sides of the issue have simply interpreted it
90
poorly. The key to resolving the abortion controversy is to broaden the scope
85. Id. at 162.
86. Id. at 165.
87. Id. at 157.
88. Id. at 156; cf. id. at 164 (“[T]he belief in life’s intrinsic objective importance (and other beliefs
that interpret and follow directly from that belief) differs from opinions about political fairness or the
just distribution of economic or other resources.”); DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 254 (distinguishing
“moral convictions” from “religious convictions”).
89. DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 156.
90. Dworkin dismisses those who do not share his reasoning. He writes that “abortion on demand”
in Europe has not been controversial “because Europe is not plagued with fundamentalist religious
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of “religious” belief and then jettison those beliefs from the argument. Once the
debate is recast in these terms, we will “see that a responsible legal settlement
of the controversy, one that will not insult or demean any group, one that
91
everyone can accept with full self-respect, is indeed available.”
VI
HAUERWAS ON ABORTION
Hauerwas, like Dworkin, is interested in “shifting the terms of the debate
92
about abortion.” He agrees with Dworkin that the relevant question is not
when life begins: “When the debate is so limited [to the question of when life
begins], it has already been uncritically shaped by the political considerations of
93
our culture, the ‘moral’ has already been determined by the ‘political.’” But,
whereas Dworkin wants to frame arguments about abortion around the
“detached” view about the sacredness of life, Hauerwas argues that an
intelligible, Christian objection to abortion has nothing to do with whether
human life has any sacred or intrinsic value. Arguments about the sacredness of
life are rooted in an anthropocentric framework, which Hauerwas thinks has
94
been absorbed into much of Christian theology through Protestant liberalism.
Against these ethical accounts, Hauerwas argues that the primary actor in the
Christian narrative is God, not man:
[F]rom the perspective of Christian convictions about life as the locus of God’s
creating and redeeming purpose, claims of life’s “value” or “sacredness” are but
empty abstractions. The value of life is God’s value and our commitment to protect it
as a form of our worship of God as a good creator and a trustworthy redeemer. Our
question is not “When does life begin?” but “Who is its true sovereign?” The creation
and meaningfulness of the term “abortion” gain intelligibility from our conviction that

movements or any serious fundamentalist sensibility.” DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 258. But “we are so
plagued” and face “militant objection from fundamentalists.” Id. This caricature is an unfortunate
dismissal of large numbers of people who object to abortion from perspectives that would not be
deemed “fundamentalist.”
91. DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 10–11. The endorsements on the back cover of Life’s Dominion
claim that “[o]ur politics would be far healthier if it had more of this kind of philosophy in it” and assert
that Dworkin’s “brave undertaking” is “engaging but never patronizing.” See id. (endorsements). Those
kinds of claims are only possible if religious arguments are silenced.
92. HAUERWAS, supra note 43, at 197. Hauerwas wrote in 1981, “It is my general view that
Christians should regard abortion as a morally unhappy practice and should exert every effort to avoid
it in their lives. Moreover they should also do all they can to help others avoid it in their lives. However,
this does not mean that I think abortions must never occur, as there may well be circumstances when
abortions are morally permissible if still morally tragic.” Id. This position is not shared by all opponents
of abortion, nor does it point to a specific policy or law about abortion. Dworkin explicitly endorses the
policy outcome in Roe v. Wade. Hauerwas rejects that outcome but does not specify the alternative
legal regime that he would endorse. That is an interesting and important question for Hauerwas, but it
is not the point of this article.
93. Id. at 213.
94. See HAUERWAS, Abortion, Theologically Understood, supra note 64, at 614 (“I want to know
where Christians get the notion that life is sacred. That notion seems to have no reference at all to God.
Any good secularist can think life is sacred.”); cf. HAUERWAS, supra note 43, at 225 (“The Christian
prohibition of abortion derives not from any assumption of the inherent value of life, but rather from
the understanding that as God’s creatures we have no basis to claim sovereignty over life.”).
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God, not man, is creator and redeemer, and thus, the Lord of life.
The Christian
95
respect for life is first of all a statement, not about life, but about God.

It is important not to take the word “statement” too literally here.
Hauerwas means a form of witness, not a proposition. Christians do not state
their respect for God; they show it. But the very framing of the abortion debate
resists this kind of showing. Most abortion arguments on both sides of the
debate rely upon “fragments” of past moral positions that “have been torn from
the social and intellectual contexts in which they gained their original
intelligibility and from which they derive such force and validity as they
96
continue to possess.” Christians are complicit in this mode of argument:
We [have] failed to show, for ourselves or others, why abortion is an affront to our
most basic convictions about what makes life meaningful and worthwhile. We tried to
argue in terms of the “facts” or on the basis of “principles” and thus failed to make
intelligible why such “facts” or “principles” were relevant in the first place. We have
spent our time arguing abstractly about when human life does or does not begin. As a
result, we have failed to challenge
the basic presuppositions that force the debate to
97
hinge on such abstractions.

Stated more succinctly, Hauerwas believes that “Christian opposition to
abortion on demand has failed because, by attempting to meet the moral
challenge within the limits of public polity, we have failed to exhibit our deepest
98
convictions that make our rejection of abortion intelligible.” Arguments that
rely solely on the life of the fetus “develop an ethic for protecting the fetus as
though the relationship between fetus and parent were that of a stranger to a
99
stranger.” Hauerwas contends that the fetus “is a child which may only later
100
become a stranger to and for its parents.”
Hauerwas’s observations highlight the relationship between the child and its
101
community. He elaborates,
[A] community’s willingness to encourage children is a sign of its confidence in itself
and its people. For children are a community’s sign to the future that life, in spite of its
hardship and tedium, is worthwhile. . . . More profoundly, children signal a
community’s confidence because they are bound to change our society and their
existence fortells inevitable challenge. Our stories and traditions are never inherited
unchanged. Indeed, the very power and truth of a tradition depends on its adaptation
by each new generation. Thus, children represent a community’s confidence that its
tradition is 102
not without merit and is strong enough to meet the challenge of a new
generation.

Hauerwas explains that these arguments “indicate the background beliefs

95. HAUERWAS, supra note 43, at 225–26.
96. Id. at 215.
97. Id. at 221; cf. HAUERWAS, supra note 2, at 232 (2004) (“My ire is not against liberalism, but
against Christians who have confused Christianity with liberalism.”).
98. HAUERWAS, supra note 43, at 212.
99. Id. at 207.
100. Id.
101. It is worth noting that Hauerwas emphasizes the entire community rather than the child’s
parents.
102. HAUERWAS, supra note 43, at 209.
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that make intelligible why abortion is generally a morally objectionable act.”
Hauerwas argues that “if Christians are to make their moral and political
convictions concerning abortion intelligible we must show how the meaning and
prohibition of abortion is correlative to the stories of God and his people that
104
form our basic conviction.” Intelligible convictions are thus inseparable from
the practices of the community from within which those convictions proceed.
But if these convictions are more about showing than arguing, then what role
might Hauerwas’s arguments about abortion have within the practice of legal
interpretation that currently situates abortion policy? Hauerwas recognizes the
dilemma:
To some it may seem that I have argued Christians right out of the current
controversy, for my argument has made appeals to religious convictions that are
inadmissible in the court of our public ethos. But it has certainly not been my
intention to make it implausible for Christians to continue to work in the public arena
for the protection of all children;
nor do I think that this implication follows from the
105
position I have developed.

Still, one might conclude that the constraint on Hauerwas’s theological
arguments in a theory of legal interpretation come from Hauerwas rather than
106
from Dworkin, particularly in light of Hauerwas’s suspicions of law and state.
But I think this misreads Hauerwas’s ambiguity about “work in the public
107
arena.” After all, he has himself participated in the practice of legal argument.
And writing about abortion in 1981, Hauerwas endorsed “political and legal
strategies that are just beginning to have an effect on reversing our society’s
108
current abortion stance.” To the extent these strategies were and are
embedded in questions of legal interpretation, Hauerwas seems to suggest that
Christian convictions and the practices they reflect might have a role in our
understanding of law and legal interpretation. Indeed, he believes that “the
109
strongest arguments against abortion involve religious presuppositions.” In
Dworkinian terms, these arguments might be included among the authorities
considered during the various stages of interpretation.
Dworkin’s insistence to the contrary—that “religious convictions or
goals . . . cannot figure in an overall comprehensive justification of the legal
103. Id. (“When institutionalized and regarded as morally acceptable or at least morally indifferent
by society, abortion is an indication that a society is afraid of itself and its children.”).
104. Id. at 222.
105. Id. at 228.
106. See Inazu, supra note 1, at i.
107. Id. at ii (discussing Hauerwas’s participation in amicus briefs, expert witness testimony, and law
teaching).
108. HAUERWAS, supra note 43, at 214. Hauerwas suggested that “a constitutional amendment that
would not prohibit states from protecting unborn life if it is the will of their legislatures . . . would at
least provide the possibility of a more refined moral debate on this issue in our society.” Id. at 288 n.6.
In his written remarks in this symposium, Hauerwas suggests the possibility of a child allowance for
every woman who finds herself pregnant, which “would at least suggest that we are a people who
understand that the willingness to bring new life into our work is a common good” and would “not
make abortion an economic necessity.” See Hauerwas, supra note 58, at 243–244.
109. HAUERWAS, supra note 43, at 284 n.1.
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structure of a liberal and tolerant pluralistic community” —would worry
Hauerwas to the extent that it “render[s] strong Christian convictions politically
irrelevant and impl[ies] that such convictions have no purchase on the way
111
things are.” But Hauerwas is equally concerned about a Christian political and
legal strategy about abortion that alters policy “without changing the
112
presuppositions of the debate.” This worry may be set in motion by Rawlsian
and Dworkinian rhetoric to exclude “religious convictions or goals,” but it is
exacerbated by a Christian response to these exclusions that attempts to comply
with the rules of the game in order to be “strategic” or “effective.” Hauerwas
cautions:
[A]s Christians we must not confuse our political and moral strategies designed to get
the best possible care for children in our society with the substance of our convictions.
Nor should we hide the latter in the interest of answering the former. For when that is
done we abandon our society to its own limits. And then our arguments fall silent in
the most regrettable manner, for we forget that our most fundamental political task is
to be and to point to that truth
which we believe to be the necessary basis for any life113
enhancing and just society.

Hauerwas’s arguments about abortion are complex on a number of fronts.
His ambiguity as to what Christian participation in “legal strategies” might
entail makes it difficult to state with specificity how his arguments would fit
114
within the interpretive practice of law that Dworkin posits. His insistence on
the connection between arguments and practices raises questions about
115
translation. His articulation of the relevant legal issues may be unclear or
116
undertheorized. And, as he well recognizes, some of his arguments will have
117
no purchase on non-Christians. In short, Hauerwas’s arguments may not
110. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 254.
111. HAUERWAS, supra note 2, at 215.
112. HAUERWAS, supra note 43, at 214.
113. Id. at 229.
114. Most of Hauerwas’s arguments are directed toward the Christian church rather than the
American polity. See id. Hauerwas wants Christians to “develop forms of care and support, the absence
of which seem to make abortion such a necessity in our society.” Id. Christians must recognize that “the
role of parent is one we all share” and that “the woman who is pregnant and carrying the child need not
be the one to raise it.” Id. Hauerwas continues, “We must be a people who stand ready to receive and
care for any child, not just as if it were one of ours, but because in fact each is one of ours.” Id.
115. See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS, WITH THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE: THE CHURCH’S
WITNESS AND NATURAL THEOLOGY 17 (2001) (explaining that “ethics cannot be separated from
theology” and that “the truthfulness of theological claims entails the work they do for the shaping of
holy lives”).
116. For example, Hauerwas offers little consideration of the roles or interests of pregnant women
(either inside or outside of the church) in his reflections about abortion. On the other hand, he insists
on linking abortion to the ethics of sex and power and on recognizing that “sexual relations are
relations of power.” HAUERWAS, Abortion, Theologically Understood, supra note 64, at 617.
117. See, e.g., HAUERWAS, supra note 43, at 2 (“Because I contend that Christian ethics is
distinctive, I make no pretense to be doing ethics for everyone.”). By way of example, consider these
comments from Hauerwas about bodily integrity: “[Christians] do not believe that we have a right to do
whatever we want with our bodies. We do not believe that we have a right to our bodies because when
we are baptized we become members of one another; then we can tell one another what it is that we
should and should not do with our bodies. . . . In the church we tell you want you can and cannot do
with your genitals. They are not your own. They are not private.” HAUERWAS, Abortion, Theologically
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prevail as the best interpretation of the law pertaining to abortion in the United
States. But this article is not about assessing the merits or clarity of Hauerwas’s
abortion arguments. The goal has simply been to show how the religious
convictions and goals embodied in his approach to abortion might fit within the
process of legal interpretation. Hauerwas offers a perspective—with religious
goals and convictions—that should be part of the conversation.
VII
CONCLUSION
Dworkin faces a choice. He could include voices like Hauerwas (and Yoder
and Skillen) in the conversation about the meaning and content of law—after
all, “in a genuinely free society, the world of ideas and values belongs to no one
118
and to everyone.” Or he could exclude the theological perspectives that
complicate his policy arguments. The former will prevent him from insisting
that his “solution” to the abortion debate is “a responsible legal settlement of
the controversy, one that will not insult or demean any group, one that
119
everyone can accept with full self-respect.” The latter inches his legal theory
closer to the aspects of Rawlsian political theory he disavows and makes the
120
appeal to integrity just another narrative of contemporary liberalism. Either
Understood, supra note 64, at 609. That claim is likely so foreign as to sound offensive to many secular
liberals. (To Hauerwas’s dismay, it will sound equally foreign to many Christians.) The point in flagging
this language is to illustrate that Hauerwas makes different kinds of claims in his writing. Some of them
are directed exclusively toward Christians; others are not. Some may effectively enter the conversation
surrounding the legal regime of abortion; some will not. Elizabeth Mensch and Alan Freeman make a
related point in commenting on some of Hauerwas’s earliest essays on abortion: “Not every religiously
rooted moral position translates, even from a theological perspective, into a demand for secular
enforcement through legislation. On the other hand, the mere fact that a moral position is deeply
rooted in religious belief does not preclude the assertion of that position in the secular public realm.”
Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abortion, 25 GA. L.
REV. 923, 1093–94 (1991).
118. DWORKIN, supra note 34, at 89.
119. DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 10–11. Dworkin’s abortion arguments also reveal how his
normative aspirations are deeply embedded in his interpretive theory. Indeed, this may be an
inescapable predicament of contemporary political thought. But it raises the important question why
the burden to disprove the anti-theological bias of public reason or law as integrity should rest on those
like Hauerwas who make theological arguments. As Steven Smith has recently argued, public reason
may not be so public after all, and its proponents may in fact be “smuggling” deeper notions into their
arguments. STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE (2010). Smith
focuses his critiques on Rawls and Martha Nussbaum. Both are “vulnerable to the criticism that [they
are] not actually arguing or reasoning but merely stating [their] own opinions and hoping that readers
will join [them] in those opinions.” Id. at 173. The same could be said of Dworkin.
120. Cf. STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT’S A GOOD THING,
TOO 137–38 (1994) (“[L]iberalism doesn’t have the content it believes it has. That is, it does not have at
its center an adjudicative mechanism that stands apart from any particular moral and political agenda.
Rather it is a very particular moral agenda (privileging the individual over the community, the cognitive
over the affective, the abstract over the particular) that has managed, by the very partisan means it
claims to transcend, to grab the moral high ground, and to grab it from a discourse—the discourse of
religion—that had held it for centuries.”); Stephen L. Carter, Liberal Hegemony and Religious
Resistance: An Essay on Legal Theory, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 41 (Michael
W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001) (“Liberalism, as a political
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Law’s Empire or Life’s Dominion has overreached—Dworkin has yet to tell us
which it is. But the arguments Hauerwas raises show us why the question
cannot go unanswered.

theory, is nowadays about output, not input; ends, not means.”).

